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REFORM OF PRIVITY 
introduction 
The doctrine of privity as laid down by the courts in the 19th century 
has long been the target of law reformers. As long ago as 1937 the United 
Kingdom Law Revision Committee suggested statutory modification of the 
privity rules, and the failure of successive governments to give effect to 
that recommendation has drawn vigorous comment from the House of 
Lords in recent leading cases. Statutory modification has been achieved in 
Israel and in two Australian states. Now the question of reform has arisen 
in New Zealand with the Report on Privity of Contract presented to the 
Attorney-General by the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Commit- 
tee in May of this year. The Report is a very full one, though some of the 
material in it does not seem to have been entirely necessary for the draft 
Bill proposed. However, it is heartening to see that the Committee is giving 
thought to the application of contractual reforms in other areas of law. 
The proposed reforms 
The doctrine of privity is generally treated as having two "limbs" or 
"aspects". The "burden" aspect provides that no contract can impose a 
binding obligation on a person who is not a party to the contract creating 
that obligation. The "benefit" aspect provides that no person can enforce 
a contractual provision conferring a benefit upon him unless he is a party 
to that contract. The Report focusses almost entirely on the latter aspect' 
of the privity rule, and indeed the proposed Bill would hardly affect the 
burden aspect at all. 
The principal element in the proposed reform is contained in clauses 
4 and 8 of the Committee's draft Bill. 
Clause 4 provides "Where a promise contained in a deed or contract 
confers, or purports to confer, a benefit on a person who is not a party to 
the deed or contract (whether or not the person is identified or in existence 
at the time when the deed or contract is made) the promisor shall be under 
an obligation, enforceable at the suit of that person, to perform that promise. 
Provided that this section shall not apply to a promise which, on the 
proper construction of the deed or contract, is not intended to create an 
obligation enforceable at the suit of that person." 
Clause 8 provides that the obligation imposed by clause 4 on such a 
promisor can be enforced by the person to whom the benefit was promised 
as if he were a party to the contract, and he may seek any of the remedies 
which he could have sought if he had been a party to the contract or deed. 
There are, however, some limitations on the right to enforce. Clause 9 
provides that where the beneficiary sues to enforce a promise, the promisor 
may raise any defences which would have been open to him if the bene- 
ficiary had been a party to the contract, or would have been open to him 
if the action had been brought by the promisee. However, set-offs or 
counter-claims which could be pleaded against the promisee may only be 
pleaded against the beneficiary where the set-off or counter-claim pleaded 
arises from the deed or contract conferring the benefit on the beneficiary. 
Further, the beneficiary is only liable on such a counter-claim where he 
has continued with his action with full knowledge of the counter-claim. 
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The draft Bill also makes provision affecting variation and discharge of 
the deed or agreement. The contract may be varied or discharged with the 
consent of the parties and the beneficiary at any time, or by the promisor 
and promisee if the agreement contained, to the knowledge of the bene- 
ficiary, a provision for variation or discharge and the variation or dis- 
charge is in accordance with that provision. However, where the bene- 
ficiary does not consent to changes in the arrangement ana is not required 
by a term of the agreement to accept them, the contract may only be varied 
or discharged within the limits set by the Bill. The primary one of these is 
in clause 5, which provides that the agreement can only be varied or dis- 
charged if the beneficiary or any other person has not altered his position 
in reliance on the promise for the benefit of the beneficiary or the bene- 
ficiary has not taken steps to enforce the benefit. If variation or discharge 
has been or may be barred by clause 5, a court order for variation or dis- 
charge may be sought under clause 7, on such conditions as the Court 
thinks fit, provided that it shall order compensation, of such amount as it 
thinks fit, be paid to the beneficiary where the beneficiary has been 
"injuriously affected" by reliance of himself or any other person on the 
promised benefit. 
Comment 
The success or otherwise of this proposed reform will be decided largely 
by the approach taken to one crucial provision, but there are other areas of 
the draft Bill which may cause some concern. The critical provision is the 
proviso to clause 4, which provides that promises for the benefit of third 
parties are not enforceable if "on the proper construction" of the agree- 
ment, the agreement was not intended to create an obligation enforceable at 
the suit of the beneficiary. This supposes that such an intention can readily 
be spelled out. In the recent English case of Woodar Investment Develop- 
ment Ltd v Wimpey Construction Ltd [I9801 1 All ER 571, the appellant 
was selling land to the respondent. The price to be paid to the appellent 
was £850,000 and there was also a covenant that "Upon completion of the 
purchase of the whole or any part of the land the purchaser shall pay to 
Transworld Trade Ltd of 25 Jermyn Street, London, S.W.1 the sum of 
£150,000." Transworld were not connected by ties of agency or trust with 
the vendor. The Law Reform Committee Report (paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4) 
clearly is of the opinion that in this case Transworld should have been 
able to sue, and that the draft Bill would allow them to do so. Yet one 
must ask whether the covenant quoted can be construed as being intended 
to give the third party a right to enforce. In contracts between lay people 
it may be even more difficult to tell whether the parties intended the bene- 
ficiary to have rights to enforce. In the leading Australian case of Coulls v 
Bagot's Executor and Trustee Coy (1967) 40 ALJR 471, the husband had 
granted rights to a quarrying company to remove stone from his land. The 
agreement, clearly drawn up without legal assistance, recited the licences 
he was giving and the royalty payments, and concluded ". . . I authorise the 
above Company to pay all money connected with this agreement to my 
wife . . . and myself . . . as joint tenants (or tenants in common) (the one 
which goes to the living partner)". The agreement was signed by the 
husband, the wife and a representative of the company. There would appear 
294 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. I ,  19811 
to have been a clear intention on the husband's behalf to confer a benefit 
on his wife-the right to receive royalty payments if he should die during 
the term of the contract-but it must be questioned whether the contract 
shows a clear intention to entitle the wife to take action to enforce that 
benefit. 
Since the courts have never had to consider before whether a third party 
was intended to have a right to enforce, none of the normal rules of 
interpretation of a contract will be of much assistance. One analogy which 
may be drawn is with the approach to whether or not an agreement was 
intended to create legal relations between the parties. The cases here show 
that in commercial agreements there is a presumption in favour of the 
agreement being legally binding, whereas in "domestic" agreements (those 
made between family members or on social occasions) there is a presumption 
against legal relations. As far as commercial agreements are concerned, the 
analogy may well suit the proposed Bill. The Report (para 8.2.1) suggests 
that there are certain contracts such as those for bulk supplies of electricity 
or water where it might be undesirable that the beneficiaries themselves can 
enforce the contract. But if there is merely a presumption that commercial 
agreements give rise to enforceable rights, the nature of the contract and 
of its subject matter, as well as factors of public policy, would give scope 
for the courts to hold that such agreements were only enforceable by the 
parties themselves. In other cases, it is submitted, it should be for business- 
men to exclude clearly a right of a third party to enforce the benefit the 
parties have agreed to confer. 
Different considerations may apply with regard to "domestic" agree- 
ments. If there is any presumption against beneficiaries being able to 
enforce such arrangements, then the beneficiary must not only show that 
the agreement was intended to be legally binding, but also that he or she 
was intended to be able to enforce it. It might be supposed that in many 
such cases, the parties may not have been aware that the beneficiary's 
right to sue was not automatic, and therefore will not have provided 
expressly for it. Yet as many of the privity cases reported are concerned 
with agreements between relatives, there may be a substantial number of 
cases which this Bill ought to cover clearly. 
If, as is submitted, neither the current rules of construction nor the 
analogy with the intention to create legal relations cases will give the 
Courts much assistance in determining whether the beneficiarv was intended 
- 
to sue, one must suggest that a clearer provision be made in any reform 
Bill. 
It is submitted that the position can be alleviated by the inclusion of 
a presumption that in all cases the beneficiary is intended to be able to 
enforce, but that the presumption should be rebuttable by evidence that 
the nature of the agreement or its subject matter or the relationship of the 
parties is such the beneficiary should not be able to enforce. This, it is 
suggested, would allow the aim of privity reform-that of giving benefici- 
aries a right to enforce the promises made for their benefit-to be achieved 
in the majority of cases, but still give scope to deal with the exceptional 
cases envisaged by the report. 
The effect of the reform will largely be determined by the availability of 
the right to enforce, but there are three other matters which are also worthy 
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of note. In each case, they relate to the relationship of the draft Bill with 
other areas of law. 
The first, and the simplest, is to note that the draft Bill would repeal 
s. 7 of the Property Law Act 1952 thus placing beneficiaries under a deed 
in the same position as beneficiaries under a contract. This would also 
obviate the problems of interpretation of the section evident in Armstrong 
v Public Trustee [I9531 NZLR 1042 and Re Wilson's Settlements [I9721 
NZLR 13. The change would appear to be for the better. However, the 
relationship with the law of trusts is not, perhaps, comfortable. The drart 
Bill (clause 14(e)) states that the reform would not in any way affect the 
law of trusts. Yet there are contracts, which do create trusts (as in Re 
Garbett [I9631 NZLR 384), and such contracts will fall within the wording 
of clause 4 of the draft Bill. If clause 14(e) is to be given full effect, such 
contracts are not covered by the draft Bill. Insofar as the beneficiary under 
such agreements has right in equity to enforce the benefit, there is no need 
for the rights created by the Bill. Yet there may be cases where it is of 
importance to know whether such contracts are covered by the Bill or not. 
The settlor of a trust has a general right to have the trust set aside if the 
settlement was made under mistake or through fraud. Yet if a trust created 
by contract can thus be set aside, there is a contract which confers a bene- 
fit on a third party which can be set aside without reference to the Bill. 
The provisions of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 and the Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979 might also affect such contracts. It would be desirable 
for a reform bill to deal more clearly with such problems. 
The second matter is more curious. The Report (para 4.2), considers 
briefly the position of contracts for the benefit of companies not yet formed, 
notes that reform may be desirable, but concludes that such reform is 
outside the scope of this Bill. Yet it appears that on the wording proposed, 
there may be occasions where a company may be able to enforce a pre- 
incorporation contract. Where the promoters o f  a company not yet incor- 
porated contract in their own names, but stipulating that a benefit will be 
given to the company on formation (e.g. the transfer of property to the 
company), then there is a valid contract for the benefit of a beneficiary not 
yet in existence. The nature of the transaction, or suitable wording in the 
contract, may make it clear that the company is to have a right to enforce 
the benefit, and the rights of the person contracting with the promoters 
would be protected by the availability of defences and counter-claims as set 
out in clause 9 of the Bill. It is difficult to see how a wide enough reform 
of privity can be carried out without allowing some such infringement of 
the company law rules so that if the Bill is not intended to affect them, 
this should be explicitly stated. 
The third matter concerns the relationship of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 and the proposed Bill. Under the draft Bill, a promisor may not 
resile from his promise to the beneficiary if the beneficiary or any other 
person has altered his position materially in reliance on the promise, 
(clause 5 ( l ) ( c ) )  or has taken steps to enforce it unless the beneficiary 
agrees, or there is provision in the agreement for the discharge of the 
contract without the consent of the beneficiary and such provision is 
known to the beneficiary. Where the discharge is or may be precluded 
by clause 5(l) (a), an order of the court authorising discharge, with or 
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without conditions, may be sought. This procedure would appear to mean 
that even where the initial contract is defeasible (as when it was entered 
into on the basis of misrepresentations by the promisee), the promisor must 
seek an order for discharge rather than exercise his remedies under the 
Contractual Remedies Act (which, in the misrepresentation example, 
might entitle the promisor to cancel the contract and be excused from 
further performance). There may be times when the seeking of an order 
for discharge is not immediately practical-it might then be more prudent 
for the promisor to commit a deliberate breach of contract and rely on 
the vitiating factor as a defence available under clause 9(2) (b) of the Bill 
than to rely on the Contractual Remedies Act. While it is hard to con- 
ceive of an instance where the promisor would be seriously prejudiced, it 
is perhaps unfortunate that this reform is not better integrated with its 
predecessor. 
Conclusion 
Although several criticisms of the draft Bill have been advanced, the 
approach taken by the Committee is one that should be capable of giving 
rise to a clear, and long overdue, reform of the rules in this area of the 
law. 
Lecturer in Law at the University of Canterbury. 
TIIE DUNEDIN COMMUNITY LAW CENTRE - A MATRIX FOR 
REFORM? 
Although the Dunedin Community Law Centre caused a few raised 
eyebrows in its idea stage, the end product settled unobtrusively into the 
legal landscape. To this extent, the enterprise reflects an ambience with 
current thinking and represents little out of the ordinary. However, it can 
also be said that the presence of the Law Centre is generating gentle 
tremors that are being felt outside the locus of its immediate activity. Here 
one finds the Law Centre in the enviable position of having wide appeal 
without sacrifice to its original ideals in the process. This note will look 
at this phenomenon in terms of the Law Centre's operation, its setting, and 
its influence, respectively. 
Operation 
The Dunedin Community Law Centre came into existence in June of 
1980. Unlike other innovations in legal services, the initiative came from 
outside the profession. The Law Centre is a charitable trust founded and 
operated by law students at the University of Otago. The core of its 
operation is a legal advice and referral service located in a storefront 
premises near the university. The service is open to the public four evenings 
a week and is staffed by senior law students under the supervision of 
